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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews summary judgment motions de novo. (R. at 3.)
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Marbury County Circuit Court (MCV-08-227),
granting summary judgment in favor of MarshCODE on all three counts,
is unreported. The opinion and order of the Marshall Court of Appeals
for the First District (Case No. 2009-CV01-0416), affirming the circuit
court’s grants of summary judgment, appear at pages 3-13 of the Record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT

OF THE

FACTS

MarshCODE is a genetic research company that formed in 1997 in
the State of Marshall. (R. at 4). It has created the country’s largest DNA
database using DNA from voluntary donors. (R. at 4). MarshCODE required that every volunteer donating before 2009 sign a Participation
Agreement (the “original agreement”), which states the parties’ rights
and responsibilities and includes a strict privacy policy. (R. at 4). The
original agreement’s privacy policy states that MarshCODE secures and
encrypts donors’ genetic information to provide maximum protection. (R.
at 14). It further provides that MarshCODE uses a unique identifier for
each donor to avoid associating donors’ genetic information with their
personal information. (R. at 14-15). Under the policy, MarshCODE can
use personal information only under certain limited circumstances, none
of which involve commercial enterprise. (R. at 15). MarshCODE reserved the option to unilaterally modify the terms and conditions by
posting the changes to its website and notifying donors using their preferred methods of communication. (R. at 14).
Aaron Murphy (“Mr. Murphy”) is a minister at the Church of Primary Saints (the “church”) in the State of Marshall. (R. at 5). As a minister, Mr. Murphy has preached his small church’s views on various
issues, including pre-marital sex and homosexuality. (R. at 5). Mr. Murphy sometimes promoted the church’s views over radio and television
broadcasts. (R. at 5). In 2000, years before becoming a minister at the
church, Mr. Murphy donated his genetic material to MarshCODE to advance scientific research. (R. at 5). He signed the original agreement
and provided MarshCODE with a saliva sample and contact information.
(R. at 12). Subsequently, Mr. Murphy moved from the city of Marshall to
Rosewood, but forgot to notify MarshCODE. (R. at 5).
In 2008, MarshCODE shifted its business model from strictly scientific research to consumer-oriented commercial services. (R. at 4). In
particular, MarshCODE developed a commercial service called “Build
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Your Family Tree” (“Family Tree”). (R. at 4). Family Tree enables subscribers to compare their DNA with the DNA of (1) other Family Tree
subscribers and (2) donors already in MarshCODE’s enormous database,
in the hope of finding a match. (R. at 4, 19). Before launching the new
service, MarshCODE tested its viability using a “test database” that randomized donor names to ensure that programmers would not see the donors’ identities. (R. at 7). Once MarshCODE deemed Family Tree
viable, it modified the service to pull donors’ information from the production database rather than the test database. (R. at 7). The production database linked donors’ genetic and personal information so that
any identified matches would be correct. (R. at 7).
When Family Tree functions properly, it sends an email to a subscriber’s match, inviting him or her to share personal information with
the subscriber. (R. at 4). This restrictive safeguard ensures that the
subscriber only gains access to the match’s otherwise restricted personal
profile if the match accepts the invitation. (R. at 5).
Sometime after December 23, 2008, MarshCODE notified its donors
that Family Tree would launch on January 1, 2009, again promising in a
modified Participation Agreement (the “modified agreement”) to protect
donors’ private information. (R. at 5, 18-19). The modified agreement
informs donors that “MarshCODE employs robust, multi-layered encryption and authentication methods and conducts regular audits to protect”
its donors’ privacy interests. (R. at 19). It also stresses that “participation in activities and services that involve personal information is voluntary.” (R. at 19). A donor may request that MarshCODE delete his or
her automatically-generated Family Tree account, which could take up
to seventy-two hours to take effect. (R. at 19). Mr. Murphy did not know
about either the modified agreement or his participation in Family Tree
because he never received the notices MarshCODE sent to him via traditional mail and email; both returned undeliverable. (R. at 6).
In March 2009, a twenty-two-year-old, gay woman named Billie Who
used Family Tree to search for her biological father, who had abandoned
her and her mother upon learning of the pregnancy. (R. at 5). Family
Tree informed Ms. Who that it had found a match, and she invited the
match to share personal information using the service’s ‘invite’ feature.
(R. at 6). Due to a functional flaw, however, the service (1) misidentified
Mr. Murphy as Ms. Who’s match, and (2) displayed his full personal profile without first obtaining his consent. (R. at 6).
Falsely believing that Mr. Murphy was her father, and angered by
his views on homosexuality, Ms. Who sought revenge. (R. at 6). She
went public, and news that Mr. Murphy had fathered and abandoned her
spread rapidly through the media and blogosphere. (R. at 6). As a result
of the scandalous rumors, Mr. Murphy’s church demoted him to administrative duties. (R. at 6). It has not allowed him to preach or appear on
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behalf of the church since. (R. at 7). Although Mr. Murphy vehemently
denied the false claims, church members and the majority of his community condemned him and called for his resignation. (R. at 6). The
paparazzi followed him and camped outside his home, causing Mr. Murphy to become highly distraught and to fear appearing in public. (R. at
6).
Upon learning of the mistake, MarshCODE conducted an investigation and learned that Family Tree had malfunctioned. (R. at 6-7). First,
Family Tree was pulling donor information from the test database rather
than the production database, which resulted in the false identification
of Mr. Murphy as Ms. Who’s match. (R. at 7). It is unknown whether
this resulted from technical or human error. (R. at 7). Second, the restrictive safeguard protecting Mr. Murphy’s personal profile failed. (R.
at 6). MarshCODE publicly apologized and admitted that Mr. Murphy is
not related to Ms. Who. (R. at 7).
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In June 2009, Mr. Murphy filed suit in Marbury County Circuit
Court against MarshCODE for (1) defamation, (2) false light invasion of
privacy, and (3) breach of contract. (R. at 2, 7). Following discovery,
MarshCODE moved for summary judgment. (R. at 7). The circuit court
granted the motion with respect to all three claims, holding that
MarshCODE was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Mr.
Murphy did not demonstrate genuine issues as to any material fact pursuant to Marshall R. Civ. P., Rule 56(c). (R. at 3, 7). Mr. Murphy appealed. (R. at 3).
On May 8, 2010, the Marshall Court of Appeals for the First District
reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed. (R. at
3). The First District held that the defamation and false light claims
both implicate the First Amendment, and a heightened actual malice
standard applied. (R. at 8-9, 11). It added that Mr. Murphy failed to
establish genuine disputes as to the publication and actionability elements of the defamation claim. (R. at 8-9). As to the false light claim,
the court found that Mr. Murphy did not establish a genuine dispute as
to the publicity and offense elements. (R. at 10-12). Last, the Court of
Appeals held that the breach of contract claim failed because the original
agreement did not constitute a binding contract as a matter of law. (R.
at 12-13).
On July 19, 2010, this Court granted Mr. Murphy leave to appeal.
(R. at 2).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The circuit court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor
of MarshCODE because Mr. Murphy has demonstrated facts to support
the elements of the (1) defamation, (2) false light invasion of privacy, and
(3) breach of contract claims.
First, Mr. Murphy has provided facts to support the defamation
claim. MarshCODE made a false and defamatory statement about Mr.
Murphy when it told Ms. Who that he was her father. Because this matter concerns Mr. Murphy’s private life, a negligence standard applies
rather than the First Amendment’s actual malice standard. Mr. Murphy
has demonstrated that MarshCODE acted either negligently or with actual malice. Finally, Mr. Murphy has shown both general and special
harm resulting from the defamatory statement.
Second, Mr. Murphy has also demonstrated facts that support his
false light invasion of privacy claim. The parties have stipulated that
MarshCODE portrayed Mr. Murphy in a false light. MarshCODE publicized the false portrayal when it transmitted it to all 140,000 subscribers
of Family Tree, including Ms. Who, and used the Internet as the medium
of transmission. Any reasonable person would find the false portrayal
highly offensive. Furthermore, like with defamation, Mr. Murphy has
shown MarshCODE acted either negligently or with actual malice.
Finally, Mr. Murphy has satisfied the elements of his breach of contract claim. The original agreement constituted a binding, unilateral
contract. Because Mr. Murphy substantially performed, MarshCODE
had an obligation to perform as well. MarshCODE breached the contract
when it (1) failed to safeguard Mr. Murphy’s private information and (2)
used his information for a commercial service without his consent. Mr.
Murphy has also shown that he suffered harm resulting from the breach.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE DEFAMATION CLAIM BECAUSE
GENUINE DISPUTES EXIST AS
TO EACH ELEMENT.
A plaintiff alleging the tort of defamation must show: (a) a false and
defamatory statement; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence; and (d) a showing of either
general or special harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
Here, Mr. Murphy has demonstrated facts that satisfy all four elements
of the defamation claim. First, the statement about Mr. Murphy’s relationship with Ms. Who was false and defamatory. Second, MarshCODE
published the communication when it released the false and defamatory
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statement to Ms. Who. Third, the system malfunction evidences negligence, which is the appropriate standard of proof under the First Amendment. Even if a heightened actual malice standard applies, Mr. Murphy
has shown MarshCODE’s reckless disregard. Finally, Mr. Murphy need
not show special harm to sustain the defamation action because the
statement is defamatory per se. Alternatively, if this court determines
that Mr. Murphy must show special harm, he has done so. Because Mr.
Murphy has shown facts to prove the elements of defamation, the circuit
court erred in granting summary judgment.
A. Mr. Murphy Has Shown that MarshCODE’s Communication
Constitutes a False and Defamatory Statement.
Because both parties stipulated that MarshCODE’s statement that
Mr. Murphy fathered Ms. Who was false, Mr. Murphy only needs to show
that it was defamatory to satisfy the first element of the defamation
claim. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). A communication is
defamatory if it tends to “harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” Id. at § 559; see also Bryson v. News Am.
Publ’ns., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (Ill. 1996). A statement can be defamatory in one of two ways: (1) per se, if the statement is so obviously and
materially harmful that a court may presume injury to the plaintiff’s
reputation or (2) per quod, if the plaintiff must prove the defamatory
meaning through extrinsic facts.1 Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607
N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ill. 1992). Even though MarshCODE’s statement to
Ms. Who was defamatory per se, Mr. Murphy has also shown its defamatory meaning through extrinsic facts.
1.

MarshCODE’s Statement Is Defamatory Per Se Because It Portrays
Mr. Murphy as an Unfit Minister.

Statements that one is unfit for or acted in a manner incompatible
with his or her trade or profession are defamatory per se. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 570, 573 (1977). In particular, “charges against a
clergyman of . . . moral misconduct” are defamatory per se because they
“affect his fitness for the performance of the duties of his profession.” Id.
at § 573 cmt. c. For example, in King v. Tanner, the court suggested that
a “false allegation of fathering a child out of wedlock” would be defamatory per se if levied against a minister. 539 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1989). As teachers and spiritual role models, ministers must possess
1. The distinction between defamatory per se and per quod appears in this section
because the first element of defamation requires that the statement be defamatory. However, this distinction is only relevant for a minority of jurisdictions with respect to requiring a showing of special harm for slander as discussed below. See infra Part I.D.
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“a pure and even unsuspected moral character” to adequately serve in
their profession. Potter v. N.Y. Evening Journal Publ’g. Co., 74 N.Y.S.
317, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902); see also Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass.
248, 254 (1816). Additionally, there is no requirement that the statement specify the trade or profession of the plaintiff in order to be defamatory per se. Hickerson v. Masters, 226 S.W. 1072, 1073 (Ky. 1921).
Because MarshCODE stated that Mr. Murphy fathered an abandoned child, it called into question Mr. Murphy’s professional integrity
as a minister, which is defamatory per se. When his church community
learned he had abandoned his child and concealed her existence, it condemned him and called for his resignation. The community’s harsh reaction to MarshCODE’s defamatory statement demonstrates that
MarshCODE portrayed Mr. Murphy as unfit for his profession as a
minister.
2.

Even if the Statement Is Not Defamatory Per Se, Extrinsic Facts
Show that It Is Defamatory Per Quod.

If one must look to extrinsic facts to discern a statement’s defamatory meaning, then it is defamatory per quod. IBP, Inc. v. Hady Enters.,
Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1164 (N.D. Fla. 2002). A defamatory meaning
exists when a statement exposes a plaintiff to “loss of professional reputation, mental anguish, or embarrassment.” Kanjuka v. MetroHealth
Med. Ctr., 783 N.E.2d 920, 928 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). To illustrate, the
statement, “Jon went to the park last weekend,” is defamatory per quod
if those hearing the statement know that “park” means “liquor store” and
that Jon is under twenty-one. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 563
cmt. e (1977). As long as the statement is reasonably susceptible to a
defamatory interpretation, whether it is truly defamatory is a question of
fact for the jury. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., v. Dabagia, 721 N.E.2d 294, 301
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Here, extrinsic facts show that MarshCODE’s statement has a defamatory meaning. MarshCODE announced that Mr. Murphy is Ms.
Who’s biological father. Ms. Who’s biological father impregnated her
mother and then abandoned both Ms. Who and her mother when he
learned of the pregnancy. MarshCODE’s statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation because it implied that Mr. Murphy was an irresponsible and immoral father for abandoning his
daughter. These implications are defamatory because a reasonable jury
could conclude that they exposed Mr. Murphy to “loss of professional reputation, mental anguish, [and] embarrassment.”
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B. MarshCODE Published the Defamatory Statement.
An unprivileged communication of a defamatory statement by any
means to a third party constitutes a publication. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 577 cmt. a-b (1977); Hecht v. Levin, 613 N.E.2d 585, 587 (Ohio
1993). Specifically, electronic transmissions of a defamatory statement
satisfy the publication requirement. In re Perry, 423 B.R. 215, 267
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010). Here, Mr. Murphy has satisfied the publication
requirement because (1) MarshCODE transmitted the defamatory statement electronically to at least Ms. Who and (2) Mr. Murphy never consented to the transmission. Therefore, MarshCODE’s electronic
transmission of the defamatory statement to Ms. Who satisfies the publication requirement.2
C. Mr. Murphy Satisfied the Appropriate First Amendment Standard
of Proof by Showing Either MarshCODE’s Negligence or Actual
Malice in Communicating the Defamatory Statement to Ms.
Who.
Tort claims that arise out of speech, like defamation, implicate the
First Amendment.3 The First Amendment requires that plaintiffs in
such cases show that the defendant acted with actual malice if: (1) the
defamatory speech targets a public figure or (2) the subject of the speech
concerns a matter of public interest. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 51-52 (1988); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (noting that the
purpose of the actual malice standard is to ensure free debate on public
issues).
Because individuals’ private lives do not implicate the public interest, private persons may prove the defendant’s culpability under a lower
standard of proof than actual malice. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974); see also Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129
(9th Cir. 1975) (noting that “sensational prying into private lives” is not
“information to which the public is entitled”); Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal.
Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 352, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (adding
that the First Amendment does not shield “sheer morbidity or gossip”
about another’s private life). Actual malice requires that a defendant
either (a) know the statement is false at the time of delivery or (b) exhibit
2. “The accidental communication of matter defamatory of another to a third person
is not a publication if there was no negligence.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 cmt. o
(1977). As discussed below, MarshCODE was at least negligent in its publication. See infra Part I.C.3.
3. False light invasion of privacy claims implicate the First Amendment for the same
reason. Much of the analysis in this section thus also applies to the false light claim below.
See infra Part II.C.
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reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387. Here,
Mr. Murphy is a private individual, and the defamatory statement concerns his private affairs. He therefore need only show MarshCODE’s
negligence. Mr. Murphy has shown that MarshCODE assumed a duty to
protect its clients’ privacy and reputational interests, and breached that
duty when it informed Ms. Who that Mr. Murphy was her father. Even if
the court applies the First Amendment’s actual malice standard, Mr.
Murphy satisfied that requirement by showing MarshCODE’s reckless
disregard.
1.

Mr. Murphy Is a Private Individual, and Thus Is Subject to a
Lower Standard of Proof than Actual Malice.

MarshCODE’s assertion that Mr. Murphy is a public figure is without merit. There are two types of public figures. General public figures
are those who have attained “general fame or notoriety in the community” by virtue of “pervasive involvement in the affairs of society.” Gertz,
418 U.S. at 352. Because this standard is so high, courts should not
“lightly assume” that someone is a general public figure. Id. Limited
purpose public figures also attain a significant degree of fame, but for a
narrow and particularized controversy existing before and giving rise to
the defamatory statement. Davis v. Keystone Printing Serv., Inc., 507
N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
Simply because one is “associated with a matter that attracts public attention” does not make him a public figure. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). Courts should “caution . . . against ‘blind
application’” of the actual malice standard. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 45 (1971) (citing Hill, 385 U.S. at 390), abrogated on
other grounds by Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
In Davis, the Illinois Appellate Court considered facts highly similar
to those here. 507 N.E.2d at 1361. In that case, a newspaper article
alleged that Davis, a minister, encouraged his parishioners to engage in
homosexual behavior. Id. The lower court found that Davis was a limited purpose public figure because he, among other things, (1) routinely
appeared on television and radio, (2) met with politicians throughout the
nation in support of veterans, and (3) was involved in a scandal years
earlier involving homosexual advances to young men. Id. at 1362-63.
The appellate court reversed, and stressed that those facts did not evidence a “preexisting public controversy” giving rise to the newspaper’s
defamatory and false statements. Id. at 1363. The prior accusation that
Davis had engaged in sexual misconduct coupled with his prior appearances on television and radio did not establish a basis for the newspaper’s false and defamatory statements. Id.
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Here, Mr. Murphy is not a general or limited purpose public figure.
First, Mr. Murphy’s church never expanded beyond a small group of people. Second, like in Davis, Mr. Murphy’s television and radio appearances to speak on matters of religion fall short of establishing limited
purpose public figure status. Third, no preexisting controversy precipitated MarshCODE’s announcement that Mr. Murphy fathered Ms. Who.
MarshCODE has provided no evidence that Mr. Murphy participated in
public debates relating to fatherhood or child abandonment.
MarshCODE’s reliance on Wilson v. Daily Gazette Co. is misplaced
because the legal factors that the court applied in that case confirm that
Mr. Murphy is a private rather than public figure. 588 S.E.2d 197, 207
(W. Va. 2003). Specifically, the court addressed whether Wilson, a high
school student noted for basketball and football, was a limited purpose
public figure after a local newspaper alleged that he exposed himself after winning a basketball game. Id. at 200. The court considered whether
(1) the plaintiff voluntarily engaged in “significant efforts” to sway public
opinion, (2) the debate existed prior to the defamatory statements, and
(3) the plaintiff “had access to channels of communication” to rebut the
statements. Id. at 206. Applying those factors, the court overturned the
lower court and held that Wilson was not a limited purpose public figure.
Id. at 207. Notably, the court stressed the fact that no prior controversy
existed before the Gazette published the false allegation. Id.
Here, like in Wilson, MarshCODE and the circuit court failed to
identify a preexisting controversy giving rise to MarshCODE’s false and
defamatory statement. While it is true that Mr. Murphy has spoken on
the subject of pre-marital sex as a minister at a small church,
MarshCODE’s false statement also reflects an entirely distinct subject
matter that was not part of that preexisting controversy. Specifically,
the defamatory and false statement here concerns Mr. Murphy’s role as a
father because it suggests that he abandoned his child and her mother.
MarshCODE has not provided any evidence that Mr. Murphy participated in public discourse on fatherhood or abandoned children. Furthermore, MarshCODE mistakenly identifies homosexuality as a preexisting
controversy when it is actually a red herring. MarshCODE’s false and
defamatory statement did not refer to Ms. Who’s sexual orientation. The
public controversy over homosexuality did not give rise to MarshCODE’s
false and defamatory statement. Therefore, Mr. Murphy’s prior comments on homosexuality and pre-marital sex did not bear on the question
of whether he is a limited purpose public figure. Because the facts do not
support the conclusion that Mr. Murphy is a general or limited purpose
public figure, a lower standard of proof applies.
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Even if Mr. Murphy Is a Public Figure, a Lower Standard of Proof
Applies Because the Statement Concerns a Purely Private Matter.

A more important distinction than that between public and private
figures is the difference between the public interest in free speech and
the “need for judicial redress” for tortious speech. Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976). Even if the plaintiff is a public figure, the “actual malice” standard of proof does not apply to defamatory or false
statements concerning private matters because such matters are not in
the public interest. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985). Simply because an event attracts media
attention does not transform it into a matter of public concern. Wolston,
443 U.S. at 167; see also Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 516
A.2d 220, 229 (N.J. 1986) (noting that “not everything that is newsworthy is a matter of legitimate public concern”). For example, in Firestone, even though dissolution of the plaintiff’s marriage attracted media
attention, it was not a public controversy because it related to the private
relationship between the plaintiff and her husband. 424 U.S. at 454.
Whether “speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [its] content, form, and context . . . as revealed by the whole
record.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
Here, MarshCODE’s defamatory statement relates to a private family relationship, which is not a matter of public concern. Any fatherdaughter connection between Mr. Murphy and Ms. Who fails to raise a
topic of legitimate public interest because, like in Firestone, it relates to a
private familial relationship. For MarshCODE to argue that the statement is a matter of public controversy worthy of public concern belies the
company’s explicit promise to safeguard the identity of familial matches.
MarshCODE promised that in the event of a match, donors could choose
to share their identities in a “trusted environment.” (R. at 16.) Additionally, MarshCODE used a restrictive safeguard to prevent automatic disclosure of match information. MarshCODE’s conduct illustrates its own
understanding that the defamatory falsehood communicated to Ms. Who
related to a purely private matter.
3.

Mr. Murphy Demonstrated MarshCODE’s Culpability Under a
Lower Standard of Proof than Actual Malice.

The Constitution allows Mr. Murphy to prove MarshCODE’s culpability under a lower standard of proof because he is a private individual
and this matter concerns private affairs. The tort of defamation requires
a showing of at least negligence on the part of the defendant in making a
false and defamatory statement. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558
(1977). In assessing a defendant’s culpability under the lower standard,
the trier of fact should consider both the “nature of the interests that the
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defendant was seeking to promote” and the reasonably foreseeable “extent of the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation.” Id. at § 580B cmt. h.
Mr. Murphy provided evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of
fact to conclude that MarshCODE acted culpably. First, MarshCODE
assumed a special duty to protect both its subscribers’ privacy interests
and their ability to choose how MarshCODE disseminates their personal
information. It recognized its duty in the original agreement it authored,
and twice reaffirmed its duty in subsequent announcements. Second,
MarshCODE breached that duty when, in a rush for profit, it conveyed
Mr. Murphy’s personal profile in a manner that erroneously stated a paternal relation with Ms. Who. Third, MarshCODE admitted that Family
Tree malfunctioned. In turn, the malfunction resulted in the false and
defamatory statement that injured Mr. Murphy. Finally, Mr. Murphy
suffered both reputational injury and mental anguish. On the facts
presented, a reasonable jury could find that MarshCODE acted
negligently.
4.

Even if a Heightened Actual Malice Standard Applies, a
Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that MarshCODE Acted with
Reckless Disregard.

MarshCODE acted with reckless disregard when its Family Tree
service conveyed false and defamatory information to Ms. Who.4 To
show reckless disregard under the actual malice standard, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant either, (1) made false or defamatory statements with a “high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity” or (2)
“entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.” HarteHanks Communc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (citing Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). Circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s state
of mind or motive, though not dispositive, weighs on the question of reckless disregard. Id. at 668.
Mr. Murphy produced evidence that would allow a reasonable jury
to find that MarshCODE acted with reckless disregard. First,
MarshCODE knew its Family Tree service posed serious privacy and
reputational risks. During testing of the service, MarshCODE used a
test database that randomized subscriber names in order to protect “the
identity of data subjects from the programmer.” (R. at 7). Cognizant of
the privacy and reputational risks, MarshCODE attempted to incorporate additional safety features into Family Tree. As crafted, the service
should have, (1) correctly identified individuals with common DNA, and
4. Note that this section applies with equal force in the false light invasion of privacy
section below. See infra Part II.C.
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(2) let a matched individual decide whether to disclose personal
information.
Had Family Tree worked properly, Mr. Murphy’s private information would not have been erroneously released to Ms. Who, and he would
not have suffered injury. However, MarshCODE never used the safety
features because Family Tree accessed the randomized test database and
released Mr. Murphy’s full personal profile to Ms. Who, implying that
they were related. Despite acknowledging the significant harm that
could result from false identifications, MarshCODE neglected to ensure
that, (1) Family Tree accessed the correct database, and (2) the restrictive safeguard worked properly, thus allowing the match to choose
whether to disclose personal information. This court should reverse the
grant of summary judgment because a reasonable jury could conclude
that MarshCODE acted recklessly.
Second, despite promises to regularly audit Family Tree,
MarshCODE failed to notice an ongoing malfunction. MarshCODE commenced an investigation only after the error resulted in serious damage
to Mr. Murphy. The investigation revealed that a pre-launch modification had failed. Specifically, prior to launching Family Tree,
MarshCODE evaluated its viability using the randomized test database.
Once it deemed the service viable, MarshCODE modified it to retrieve
personal records from the production database instead. It then launched
the service on January 1, 2009. Nearly three months later, Family Tree
incorrectly transmitted Mr. Murphy’s personal profile to Ms. Who. During its investigation, MarshCODE discovered that the reason for the incorrect match was because the service was still drawing from the
randomized test database instead of the production database. These
facts suggest that MarshCODE’s service was malfunctioning for nearly
three months and that MarshCODE did not regularly audit the service
as promised. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that
MarshCODE acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of
identified matches.
Finally, MarshCODE used Mr. Murphy’s genetic and personal information despite strong evidence that he never received notice of his participation in Family Tree. MarshCODE sought to provide notice to Mr.
Murphy by email and traditional mail, however, both notices returned
undeliverable. At this point, rather than try to contact Mr. Murphy
again by another other means, or remove him from the database,
MarshCODE instead decided to capitalize on Mr. Murphy’s genetic material and use it for commercial gain. The failure to obtain Mr. Murphy’s
permission for the wholly new use of his DNA strongly evidences
MarshCODE’s reckless disregard for Mr. Murphy’s privacy interests and
rights to control use of his personal information.
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A reasonable jury could find that MarshCODE acted with reckless
disregard based on, (1) the system malfunction, (2) the failure to adequately audit, and (3) the failure to obtain Mr. Murphy’s consent. Therefore, this court should reverse the grant of summary judgment.
D. Mr. Murphy Has Shown Both General and Special Harm, and
Thus the Defamatory Statement Is Actionable Whether It Is Per
Se or Per Quod.
Under some circumstances, a plaintiff may recover for defamation
without proving special harm. See, e.g., Vanover v. Kan. City Life Ins.
Co., 553 N.W.2d 192, 196-97 (N.D. 1996). A minority of states require a
plaintiff to prove special harm if the defamatory statement is per quod
rather than per se. Id. at 196-97; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 570
(1977).
Mr. Murphy does not need to prove special harm for two reasons.
First, MarshCODE’s defamatory statement is libel, which never requires
a showing of special harm. Second, if the State of Marshall recognizes a
distinction between per se and per quod, MarshCODE’s statement is defamatory per se, which also does not require a showing of special harm.
Even if MarshCODE’s statement is defamatory per quod, Mr. Murphy
has satisfied the special harm requirement. Therefore, Mr. Murphy has
established the fourth and final element of the defamation claim, and the
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment.
1.

Requiring a Showing of Special Harm Denies a Plaintiff the Ability
To Recover for Significant Reputational Injury.

In jurisdictions that distinguish between libel and slander, defamatory communications over the Internet “are considered libel.” Too Much
Media, LLC v. Hale, 993 A.2d 845, 864-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (noting that Internet postings are just as permanent as other
traditional forms of written publications); see also Mathis v. Cannon, 573
S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga. 2002). Libel never requires a plaintiff to show special harm. Restatement (Second) Torts § 569 (1977). Because
MarshCODE transmitted its defamatory statement over the Internet, it
constitutes libel and Mr. Murphy need not show special harm.
Even if MarshCODE’s defamatory statement is slander per quod, requiring a plaintiff to prove special damages frustrates the main purpose
of the tort of defamation, which is to allow a plaintiff to publicly vindicate his or her good name. Vanover, 553 N.W.2d at 197. Because “people
consider their reputation ‘a major factor in a satisfactory existence,’ ” requiring a plaintiff to prove special harm in a defamation action is inappropriate. Id. at 197 (quoting Toney v. WCCO Television, 85 F.3d 383,
395 (8th Cir. 1996)). Moreover, a statement with an implied defamatory
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meaning is no less damaging than a statement that is defamatory on its
face. Rice v. Simmons, 2 Del. 417, 429 (Del. 1838). Therefore, requiring
a plaintiff to prove special harm simply because a communication’s defamatory meaning is implied rather than overt denies victims with valid
claims an opportunity to recover for significant reputational harm. The
State of Marshall should thus not require Mr. Murphy to show special
harm.
2.

Mr. Murphy Only Must Show General Harm Because the
Statement Is Defamatory Per Se.

If a statement is defamatory per se, a plaintiff need not show special
harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 cmt. b (1977). As noted
above, Mr. Murphy has demonstrated that MarshCODE’s statement is
defamatory per se. See supra Part I.A.1. Therefore, Mr. Murphy’s
reputational harm suffices for purposes of actionability.
3.

Even if MarshCODE’s Statement Is Defamatory Per Quod, a
Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that Mr. Murphy Suffered
Special Harm.

If the State of Marshall, for whatever reason, requires a showing of
special harm, Mr. Murphy has satisfied this requirement. To show special harm, a plaintiff need not provide an exact dollar amount. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 575 cmt. b (1977). For example, proof of
demotion establishes special harm. Id. Likewise, “loss of the society,
companionship and association of friends may be sufficient when their
hospitality or assistance has been such that it can be found to have a
money value.” Id.; see also Pettibone v. Simpson, 66 Barb. 492, 494 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1873) (“Refusal of gratuitous entertainment to the slandered
party, by a person by whom she had been accustomed to be gratuitously
entertained is sufficient, by way of special damage, to sustain the action.”). Special harm may also be the loss of future employment opportunities. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 575 cmt. b (1977). The plaintiff
must also show that the special harm resulted from the defamatory
statement. Id. at § 575. The defamatory statement is the legal cause of
any special harm suffered even if the defendant made it only to one person who then repeated it to others so as to have “repercussive effects” on
the defamed person’s reputation. Id. at § 576 cmt. e.
Mr. Murphy has demonstrated that he suffered three types of special harm resulting from MarshCODE’s defamatory statement. First,
Mr. Murphy’s small church suspended and then demoted him. Second,
Mr. Murphy lost the “society, companionship and association” of his
friends and church community. Third, the defamatory statement hurts
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Mr. Murphy’s chances to find employment as a minister at another
church. Therefore, Mr. Murphy has established special harm.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE FALSE LIGHT CLAIM BECAUSE A
REASONABLE JURY COULD CONCLUDE
THAT MR. MURPHY SATISFIED ALL
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM.
False light invasion of privacy occurs when one portrays another (1)
in a false light, (2) before the public, and (3) in a highly offensive manner.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977). As with defamation, the
standard of proof for the defendant’s culpability turns on whether the
false portrayal concerns a public figure or touches on a matter of public
interest. Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E caveat (1977).
Because MarshCODE admits that the announcement it made to Ms.
Who was false, thereby establishing the first element of the claim, Mr.
Murphy only has to establish that MarshCODE (1) publicized the false
portrayal and (2) did so in a highly offensive manner. He has provided
evidence to satisfy both elements. First, Family Tree’s malfunction enabled all 140,000 subscribers, including Ms. Who, to infer an erroneous
genetic connection with Mr. Murphy, thereby satisfying the publicity element. Second, Mr. Murphy has satisfied the offense element because a
reasonable person would find the false portrayal highly offensive. As
noted above, Mr. Murphy demonstrated both MarshCODE’s negligence
and actual malice in making the false portrayal, thereby satisfying the
First Amendment’s standard of proof. See supra Part I.C.1-2. Therefore,
because Mr. Murphy has shown facts sufficient to support each element
of the false light claim, the circuit court erred when it granted summary
judgment.
A. A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that MarshCODE Publicized
the False Portrayal.
To satisfy the publicity element, a defendant must (a) communicate
the false portrayal “to the public at large” or (b) convey it in a way that
makes it “substantially certain to become . . . public knowledge.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a (1977). The publicity element
reduces to a question of whether the portrayal was a “private [or] public
communication.” Id. Whether one publicized a false portrayal is a question of fact for the jury. Johnson v. K mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1197
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
MarshCODE sufficiently publicized its false portrayal of Mr. Murphy in three respects. First, MarshCODE enabled all 140,000 Family
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Tree subscribers to infer an erroneous genetic connection with Mr. Murphy by granting them access to his personal profile similar to a social
networking site. Second, under the special relationship exception, because the false portrayal convinced Ms. Who that she was Mr. Murphy’s
daughter, relaying it to her alone is sufficient for the publicity requirement. Third, MarshCODE’s use of the Internet to disclose matches facilitated rapid dissemination of the false portrayal to the public at large.
Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Murphy has satisfied the publicity element.
1.

MarshCODE Publicized the False Portrayal When It Granted All
140,000 Subscribers Access to Mr. Murphy’s Profile.

Publication of a false portrayal in a newspaper, radio broadcast, or
similar kind of public forum satisfies the publicity element of false light
invasion of privacy. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a (1977).
Posting information to social networking profiles like MySpace is “materially similar . . . to a newspaper publication or a radio broadcast” because the public at large may easily access the information. Yath v.
Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). Where a defendant posts false portrayals in public forums, like social networking
sites, it does not matter how many members of the public view the post.
Id. at 43-44 (noting that “the number of actual viewers is irrelevant”). A
restrictive safeguard may turn an otherwise public forum into a private
one. Id. at 44.
In Yath, the plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy after the defendant
posted the plaintiff’s confidential medical information, including details
of an extra-marital sexual relationship, to an unrestricted MySpace
page. Id. at 38-39. The district court granted the defendant’s summary
judgment motion. Id. at 40. Overturning the district court, the Court of
Appeals of Minnesota directly addressed whether the defendant’s posting on MySpace constituted publicity.5 Id. The court held that such a
posting met the publicity element despite the failure to show that “a sufficient number of people had seen the webpage.” Id. at 42.
Here, MarshCODE’s actions satisfy the publicity requirement because it configured Family Tree in a manner resembling a social
networking site. Subscribers may, similar to MySpace or Facebook, “invite” other subscribers to reveal personal information. Like users of
Facebook or MySpace, subscribers of Family Tree may only access another’s personal profile if the other subscriber has granted permission.
When Family Tree malfunctioned, the restrictive safeguard stopped
working and effectively turned the service into a public forum. Once that
5. Note that Minnesota, like Marshall, relies on the Restatement’s understanding of
publicity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
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happened, any of the service’s 140,000 subscribers, like Ms. Who, could
access Mr. Murphy’s profile without first obtaining his permission. Because the system accessed the randomized test database, all 140,000
subscribers could have inferred a false familial relation with Mr. Murphy, provided the service randomly selected his name. This is exactly
what happened when Ms. Who used the “invite” feature. Therefore, like
in Yath, even if Ms. Who was the only subscriber to view Mr. Murphy’s
profile, the fact that thousands of others could have viewed it is sufficient
to show publicity.
2.

Even if MarshCODE Did Not Grant All Subscribers Access to Mr.
Murphy’s Profile, Communication of the False Portrayal to Ms.
Who Alone Constitutes Publicity Under the Special
Relationship Exception

If the plaintiff has a “special relationship with the [person or persons] to whom the information is disclosed,” the plaintiff need not show
widespread publicity. Johnson, 723 N.E.2d at 1197; Olson v. Red Cedar
Clinic, 681 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004). Under this exception,
publicizing to one person suffices. Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d
681, 693 (Ind. 1997); Olson, 681 N.W.2d at 309. Special relationships
include “fellow employees, club members, church members, [and] family.” Doe v. TCF Bank Ill., FSB, 707 N.E.2d 220, 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(emphasis added). Delivery of false information to a person close to a
plaintiff “may be just as devastating” as though conveyed to the public
because a negative reaction of one close to a plaintiff often leads to
greater embarrassment for the plaintiff. Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560
N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see also Beaumont v. Brown, 257
N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Bradley v.
Saranac Cmty. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 565 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Mich. 1997).
Here, MarshCODE sufficiently publicized the false portrayal when
it informed Ms. Who that she shared a special relationship with Mr.
Murphy. Believing she found the father who abandoned her before she
was born, Ms. Who reacted explosively. Even though Mr. Murphy never
in fact fathered Ms. Who, neither MarshCODE nor Ms. Who realized
that until after Ms. Who repeated the false portrayal to the public. Ms.
Who reacted exactly the way anticipated by the special relationship exception, and thereby caused Mr. Murphy to suffer a greater embarrassment than had MarshCODE relayed the false portrayal to a
disinterested third party. Therefore, under the special relationship exception, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Murphy has satisfied
the publicity requirement.
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MarshCODE Sufficiently Publicized the False Portrayal Because It
Conveyed It to Ms. Who in a Readily-Transferrable Electronic
Format

The Internet is a forum known for brewing falsehoods. More than
with newspapers, radio, or other means of communication, users of the
Internet “have tremendous power to harm reputation.” Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
Duke L.J. 855, 863 (2000). Because the Internet has “remove[d] barriers
to being heard,” false statements spread like wildfire and thus are substantially certain to become public knowledge.6 Id. at 895. MarshCODE
portrayed Mr. Murphy in a false light on the Internet, which enabled Ms.
Who to rapidly spread the false portrayal to the public at large through
the blogosphere. As such, Mr. Murphy satisfied the publicity requirement because MarshCODE transmitted the false portrayal over the
Internet.
B. A Reasonable Jury Could Find the False Portrayal Highly
Offensive
To recover for false light invasion of privacy, the false portrayal
must be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 652D (1977). Whether a reasonable person would be highly
offended is a question of fact for the jury. Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d
284, 296288-89 (N.J. 1988); see also Prosser and Keeton On the Law of
Torts § 14 (W. Page Keeton et al., eds., 5th ed. 1984) (citing Strickler v.
NBC, 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958)). Before sending the question to
the jury, however, a court must first consider the false portrayal and surrounding context to determine whether it “is capable of the [offensive]
meaning assigned to it by [the] plaintiff.” Romaine, 537 A.2d at 290. If
the false portrayal could convey the assigned meaning, then the jury determines whether a reasonable person would find it highly offensive
based on the following factors: “ the degree of the intrusion, the context . . .and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives . . . , the setting into which [the defendant] intrudes,
and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.” Hill v. NCAA,
865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994). Some jurisdictions emphasize the objec6. For examples of how rapidly rumors proliferate on the Internet, consider Wonder
Years actor Fred Savage’s untimely and unrealized death arising from a drunk driving
accident. App. A. Alternatively, consider comedian Bill Cosby’s fourth and most recent
death and resurrection. App. B. For yet another example, consider Chief Justice Roberts’s
recent and never actualized resignation from the U.S. Supreme Court. App. C. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized how quickly people can share information over the Internet.
See MGM. Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 923 (2005) (defendant held liable for
contributory infringement of copyright after its service enabled customers to quickly copy
and transmit billions of music files to share with people all over the world).
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tive nature of this inquiry and instruct the jury that a hypersensitive
individual’s reaction is not a reasonable one. See Wolfson v. Lewis, 924
F. Supp. 1413, 1421 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc.,
379 S.E.2d 551, 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat’l
Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 990 (Ill. 1989).
Here, Mr. Murphy understood MarshCODE’s false portrayal to imply that he abandoned his daughter and her mother. The evidence
strongly suggests that the false portrayal conveyed that meaning.
MarshCODE informed Ms. Who that Mr. Murphy is her father. Ms.
Who’s actual father abandoned her and her mother. The next logical
step is to conclude that Mr. Murphy is the biological father who abandoned Ms. Who and her mother. Therefore, because the false portrayal
is capable of the offensive meaning Mr. Murphy attached to it, the question of whether a reasonable person would have taken offense is one for
the jury.
A jury applying the Hill factors could conclude that a reasonable
person would find the false portrayal highly offensive. First,
MarshCODE’s false statement exhibited a high degree of intrusion because it disclosed Mr. Murphy’s private genetic and personal information. Second, the context provides another reason for offense because
MarshCODE betrayed Mr. Murphy’s trust when it abruptly changed its
business model to use sensitive genetic and personal data for profit.
Third, the circumstances surrounding the intrusion reveal that
MarshCODE intended to extend maximum protection for its donors’ privacy interests. Both the original and modified agreements contain privacy policies that emphasize the importance of confidentiality. Fourth,
MarshCODE invaded Mr. Murphy’s fundamental zone of privacy concerning his family, a setting that the nation has long recognized as important.7 MarshCODE’s implication that Mr. Murphy abandoned his
family constituted a personal affront to Mr. Murphy’s character and
morals. Finally, Mr. Murphy expected a high degree of privacy concerning use of his genetic and personal information because he signed an
agreement promising such privacy. Combined, these factors show that
any reasonable person would be highly offended at MarshCODE’s false
portrayal of Mr. Murphy. Therefore, MarshCODE’s argument that Mr.
Murphy is a hypersensitive individual is without merit, and a reasonable
jury could conclude that Mr. Murphy has satisfied the final element of
his false light claim.
7. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989) (“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions.”) (quoting
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
454 (1976) (dissolution of a marriage is a matter of private concern because it concerns the
internal affairs of the family).
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C. Mr. Murphy Has Satisfied the Appropriate First Amendment
Standard of Proof
Like with defamation, the First Amendment imposes an actual malice standard of proof on plaintiffs alleging false light invasion of privacy
if the invasion concerns a public figure or a matter of public interest.
Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52; Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88. For private
individuals and private matters, however, both the Supreme Court and
the Restatement have permitted individual states to apply a lower standard of proof as long as it is not strict liability. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 25051 (1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E caveat (1977). Several
states have chosen to apply a lower standard of proof.8 Applying a lower
standard of proof reflects the principle that private individuals are “more
deserving of recovery” because they are “more vulnerable” than public
figures. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Marshall should follow the Supreme
Court’s reasoning and, like other states, adopt a lower standard for private persons and private matters.
As noted above, if this Court holds that Mr. Murphy is a private
individual or the false portrayal concerns private matters, Mr. Murphy
has demonstrated facts to establish at least MarshCODE’s negligence.
See supra Part I.C.3. Also as noted above, even if this Court holds that a
heightened actual malice standard applies, Mr. Murphy has demonstrated MarshCODE’s reckless disregard. See supra Part I.C.4. Mr.
Murphy has satisfied the First Amendment standard of proof because he
has demonstrated either MarshCODE’s negligence or reckless disregard.
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MR. MURPHY’S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE
GENUINE DISPUTES EXIST AS TO
ALL FOUR ELEMENTS

ON

To defeat a motion for summary judgment on a claim for breach of
contract, a plaintiff must establish genuine disputes as to four elements:
(a) existence of a contract; (b) performance of its conditions by the plaintiff; (c) breach by the defendant; and (d) resulting damages. Kopley Gr.
8. See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 257 (5th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that a private individual may seek compensatory damages without showing malice); Reader’s Digest
Ass’n v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610, 616 (Cal. 1984) (distinguishing public from private
persons for purposes of determining the level of culpability); Fils-Aime v. Enlightenment
Press, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (N.Y. App. Term 1986) (applying a “grossly irresponsible”
standard for private individuals bringing privacy actions); West v. Media Gen. Convergence,
Inc. 53 S.W.3d 640, 647-48 (Tenn. 2001) (adopting negligence as the standard for private
individuals alleging a defamation privacy cause of action); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers,
Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 77
(W. Va. 1984) (noting that defendant publisher must exhibit “at least negligence” in privacy
suit brought by private plaintiff).
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V., L.P. v. Sheridan Edgewater Props., 876 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007). Mr. Murphy has presented evidence showing that the original
agreement constitutes a binding contract, which Mr. Murphy substantially performed and MarshCODE breached. Additionally, Mr. Murphy
showed that the breach resulted in damages. Therefore, because Mr.
Murphy has established all four elements, the circuit court erred when it
granted summary judgment.
A. The Original Agreement Constitutes a Binding Contract and
Contains the Essential Terms
The original agreement constitutes a binding contract because the
terms of the offer were definite and Mr. Murphy accepted those terms for
valuable consideration. The modified agreement is invalid because its
terms are outside the scope of what Mr. Murphy and MarshCODE contemplated when they made the agreement. The original agreement thus
obligates MarshCODE to perform under its terms.
1.

The Original Agreement Constitutes a Binding Contract

One who makes a definite offer, which the offeree accepts for valuable consideration, is bound by the terms of the resulting contract. Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983). In determining whether a contract is binding, courts first look to whether the
parties intended to be bound. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §201
(1981). When an agreement includes a policy statement, courts often
consider the relative use of language in the statement to determine
whether the parties considered it binding. See, e.g., Pratt v. Heartview
Found., 512 N.W. 2d 677, 678 (N.D. 1994); Martens v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 741 (Minn. 2000) (holding that only specific
statements about policies are binding). For example, in Stewart v. Chevron, the court found that the words “shall,” “will,” and “must” indicated
that the contract’s policy statements were binding. 762 P.2d 1143, 114546 (Wash. 1988). In Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., language such as “cannot,” “are required,” and “are never” indicated that
the policy statements were binding. 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987). A
definite offer develops into a binding contract if the offeree accepts the
offer and gives valuable consideration by either (a) giving an exchange
promise, which forms a bilateral contract, or (b) acts of performance,
which form a unilateral contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 32 (1981).
MarshCODE made a definite offer because, like in Stewart and
Duldulao, the privacy policy statements in the original agreement contained mandatory language. For example, it stated that Mr. Murphy’s
“genetic and phenotypic information will be kept in a secured protected
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research database,” and that anytime his “information is used,
MarshCODE will only refer to [his] unique identifier . . . , which will only
be accessible by the MarshCODE database analysts.” (R. at 14) (emphasis added). Furthermore, it provided that Mr. Murphy’s “personal information will never be associated with [his] genetic information.” (R. at 14)
(emphasis added). Not only did MarshCODE use mandatory language,
describing in detail its own obligations, it also specifically provided that
Mr. Murphy could accept the terms and conditions by signing the agreement. Such language constitutes a definite offer.
The original agreement instructed Mr. Murphy to “read these terms
and conditions carefully [because] signing this form constitutes acceptance of them.” (R. at 14). It also provided that Mr. Murphy could elect to
participate in the genetic research program by donating a saliva sample.
Mr. Murphy signed the agreement, thereby accepting MarshCODE’s offer. He also gave valuable consideration for the offer by providing
MarshCODE with his saliva sample as requested. Therefore, because
Mr. Murphy accepted the offer and gave valuable consideration by an act
of performance, the original agreement became a binding, unilateral
contract.
MarshCODE erroneously relies on Grenier v. Air Express Int’l Corp.,
to argue that the privacy policy statements in the original agreement are
not contractual. 132 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (D. Minn. 2001). In that case, the
plaintiff sued his employer for failing to pay him incentive bonuses. Id.
at 1199. However, because the incentive program “unambiguously
vest[ed] discretion in the defendant” to determine what business qualified for the incentive bonus, the court held that no contractual obligation
existed. Id. at 1201. Grenier is distinguishable from our case because
the original agreement did not vest MarshCODE with discretion to determine the meaning of terms in the agreement. To the contrary, the
agreement included specific and definite promises about the confidentiality of donors’ information.
2.

The Original Agreement Contains the Essential Terms of the
Contract

MarshCODE’s unilaterally-modified agreement was invalid and
failed to supersede the original agreement for four reasons. First, the
modifications were outside the scope of what MarshCODE and Mr. Murphy anticipated when they made the contract. Second, because Mr. Murphy received no notice and was unaware of the modifications, the
changes are unenforceable due to lack of mutuality. Third, because the
original agreement deliberately limited MarshCODE’s ability to distribute Mr. Murphy’s information to commercial services, MarshCODE
could not thereafter invoke the modification clause to effectuate the
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same purpose without Mr. Murphy’s consent. Fourth, the State of Marshall should enforce genetic research companies’ promises to protect donors’ confidentiality so as to avoid deterring others from participating in
important genetic research.
a.

The modifications are invalid because the parties did not
contemplate them at the time they made the original agreement

In determining the essential terms of a contract, courts look to the
parties’ shared intent at the time they signed the contract. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981). While one party to an agreement
may reserve the option to unilaterally modify terms, modifications must
be limited to terms “whose general subject matter was anticipated when
the contract was entered into.” Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4th
779, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). If a party unilaterally modifies the agreement to add an entirely new, unanticipated term that is detrimental to
the other party, it breaches the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Id. at 796. The Restatement, like the Badie court, also protects
a party entering into a standardized contract against unforeseeable modifications by the drafting party. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211
(1981). Under the Restatement’s reasonable expectations doctrine,
“where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting
[assent to a standardized agreement] would not do so if he knew that the
agreement contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.” Id.
In Badie, a bank exercised its option to modify the terms of a credit
agreement. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276-278. The modifications required the
credit holders to submit disputes to arbitration. Id. Because the original
agreement contained no mention of arbitration, the court found that
there was no reason for the customer to anticipate the modification. Id.
at 287. By adding an entirely new term “not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered into,” the bank
had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 284.
Therefore, the court found the clause unenforceable. Id. at 291.
In the original agreement, MarshCODE reserved the option to revise
the terms and conditions “by updating the relevant posting on
MarshCODE’s website and by sending out relevant notices to [Mr. Murphy], using [his] preferred method of communication.” (R. at 14). The
modified agreement purported to (1) allow MarshCODE to use Mr. Murphy’s genetic and phenotypic information for commercial services and (2)
relax the privacy policy by cancelling a number of its confidentiality obligations under the original agreement. This case is similar to Badie because, while Mr. Murphy knew MarshCODE could revise the terms and
conditions, nothing in the original agreement would have caused him to

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\28-1\SFT104.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 25

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

6-APR-11

11:55

143

anticipate that MarshCODE would relax the privacy policy and use his
information for something other than genetic research. Also, when
MarshCODE presented the standardized, original agreement to Mr.
Murphy, it knew that the only incentives it provided for agreeing to donate were (a) the promotion of scientific research and (b) the promise to
keep donors’ information strictly confidential. MarshCODE was therefore aware of a strong likelihood that Mr. Murphy would not assent to
the agreement without those incentives. Thus, the modifications failed
to become a part of the agreement based on the reasonable expectations
doctrine and because the parties did not contemplate the changes at the
time they made the original agreement.
b.

The modifications are unenforceable due to lack of mutuality
because Mr. Murphy received no notice of and never consented to
them

Many states have held that unilateral modifications to a contract are
invalid unless the non-drafting party manifested assent to the modifications.9 See, e.g., Kortum-Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693,
698-99 (Mont. 2009); Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062, 1066
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “a party can’t unilaterally change the terms
of a contract; it must obtain the other party’s consent before doing so”)
(citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,
549 F.2d 114, 118 (9th Cir. 1976)).
Courts have been more accepting of modifications in situations
where the plaintiff received adequate notice. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Mattingly, 829 A.2d 626, 631 (Md. 2003) (holding that because “respondent did not have adequate notice. . . [he] could not have voluntarily assented to arbitration”); Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358, 364-65
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (holding that because notice was inadequate and plaintiff had not affirmatively assented, the modification was
unenforceable). Courts have identified two important considerations for
determining whether notice is adequate. First, courts look to see if there
was a delay before the modifications went into effect. See, e.g., Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
contract became valid after the consumer failed to opt out of being bound
by the terms after a thirty-day waiting period). Second, courts also look
at the manner in which the drafting party sent the notice; “stuffing” the
notice in a bill, for example, is insufficient. See Kortum-Managhan, 204
9. Often, these courts have looked at such questions in the context of consumer credit
and lending statutes, and therefore the cases are not completely analogous to general contract law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-2053.205 (1974). Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the
factors those courts and legislatures relied on for determining the validity of unilateral
modifications.
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P.3d at 700-01 (holding that a “bill stuffer” was insufficient notice because the recipient may not have seen it or become aware of the modifications); Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291.
In Douglas, the defendant moved to compel arbitration based on a
clause that it added to an agreement with the plaintiff. 495 F.3d at 1065.
The defendant posted the revised conditions on its website. Id. at 1066.
The court held that because (1) the original agreement did not require
the plaintiff to periodically check the website for changes to the terms
and (2) the plaintiff received no other notice of the modifications, mutual
assent was lacking and the changes were unenforceable. Id.
MarshCODE’s modifications are invalid because of lack of mutuality
and inadequate notice. First, Mr. Murphy did not receive notice of the
modifications, and MarshCODE knew this because the notices returned
undeliverable. Like the plaintiff in Kortum-Managhan, Mr. Murphy was
unaware of the modifications and thus could not give his voluntary consent. As such, mutuality was lacking and the modifications are invalid.
Second, MarshCODE uploaded Mr. Murphy’s private genetic and contact
information to Family Tree before he could exercise his right to opt out.
Therefore, there was no waiting period. Furthermore, even if a donor
submits a request to opt out, MarshCODE may take an additional seventy-two hours to process the request, thereby prolonging unauthorized
use of the donor’s information. This also weighs in favor of finding the
modifications invalid.
c.

Because the original agreement limited MarshCODE’s ability to
distribute Mr. Murphy’s information for commercial use,
MarshCODE could not thereafter invoke the modification
clause to effectuate the same purpose

An interpretation of a term that is consistent with the other terms of
the agreement is preferable to one that leaves other terms ineffectual,
unreasonable, or without meaning. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§203(a) (1981). MarshCODE argues that the unilateral modification
clause allows it to alter the terms of the original agreement so that it
may use Mr. Murphy’s private genetic and contact information for Family Tree. However, this expansive reading of the clause is entirely inconsistent with another provision of the original agreement that
deliberately restricted MarshCODE’s right to release Mr. Murphy’s private information to third parties or commercial companies.10 To read
the unilateral modification clause so broadly renders ineffectual
MarshCODE’s promise not to release Mr. Murphy’s information for com10. The limited circumstances include if release of the information is legally required,
for ethical reasons, to enforce the agreement, to respond to certain claims, and to protect
users. (R. at 15).
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mercial use. Therefore, the “preferable” interpretation of the unilateral
modification clause does not permit MarshCODE to invoke the clause to
use Mr. Murphy’s information for commercial services, such as Family
Tree, without his consent.
d.

The State of Marshall should enforce genetic research companies’
promises to protect donors’ confidentiality so as to avoid
deterring others from participating in important genetic
research

The State of Marshall should not allow research-based companies to
unilaterally modify privacy policies to use donors’ data for commercial
services without their consent. Such modifications ignore the original
intent of the donors when they agree to provide their personal and genetic information. Scientific research is extremely important to our developing society. See, e.g., Jon Beckwith, The Human Genome Initiative:
Genetics’ Lighting Rod, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 7-8 (1991) (stating that
genetic research “will speed up discovery of new genes that are diseaseconnected or related to other biological processes such as development”
and perhaps lead to discovering cures for certain diseases). Allowing
such substantial and unforeseeable modifications without requiring consent of the donors would deter others from participating or assisting in
important genetic research.
B. A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that Mr. Murphy Substantially
Performed and Therefore Is Entitled To Enforce the Original
Agreement Against MarshCODE
To recover on a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she substantially performed the terms of the contract.
Pepsi Midamerica v. Harris, 232 S.W.3d 648, 653-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
The doctrine of substantial performance applies when both parties have
breached the contract; it allows a plaintiff who has committed a minor
breach to recover so long as the “benefits received by [defendant] are far
greater than the injury done to him by the [plaintiff’s] breach.” Zemco
Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 270 F.3d 1117, 1126 (7th Cir.
2001) (quoting Dove v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 931, 933 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982)). Substantial performance is generally a question of fact
for the jury. Id.
The original agreement required Mr. Murphy to provide his genetic
and phenotypic information to MarshCODE. It also required him to provide contact information and keep that information up-to-date. Mr. Murphy provided his genetic, phenotypic, and contact information, but
inadvertently forgot to update his contact information when he moved.
MarshCODE contends that because Mr. Murphy failed to perform all of
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his contractual obligations, he may not recover for breach of contact.
This argument, however, fails to distinguish between material and nonmaterial breaches.
Three factors are relevant for determining whether a failure to perform is material:11 whether (1) it significantly deprived the other party
of a reasonably expected benefit, (2) the breaching party would suffer
substantial forfeiture,12 and (3) the breaching party’s behavior comports
with the standards of good faith and fair dealing. Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 241 (1981). There is no dispute that Mr. Murphy forgot to
provide MarshCODE with his updated contact information, but the question is whether his failure to do so amounted to a material breach of the
agreement. A reasonable jury considering these factors could conclude
that Mr. Murphy substantially performed.
The Illinois Appellate Court has elaborated on the first factor. In re
Liquidation of Inter-Am. Ins. Co. of Ill., 768 N.E.2d 182(Ill. App. Ct.
2002). In Inter-Am. Ins. Co. of Ill., Inter-American and ERAC entered
into an agreement where Inter-American agreed to pay premiums to
ERAC, and ERAC agreed to provide reinsurance. Id. at 185. The parties
also agreed that Inter-American would maintain an asset portfolio. Id.
at 185. The court found that Inter-American’s failure to maintain the
portfolio was not a material breach of the agreement. Id. at 193-94. It
had substantially performed by paying the premiums, its main obligation, and was therefore entitled to enforce the contract against ERAC.
Id.
Here, the original agreement’s main purpose was for Mr. Murphy to
provide his information for MarshCODE’s research and for MarshCODE
to keep Mr. Murphy’s information confidential. The contact information
obligation was a relatively minor provision because, like ERAC in InterAm. Ins. Co. of Ill., MarshCODE received the primary benefit it bargained for when it received Mr. Murphy’s genetic and phenotypic information. Mr. Murphy’s failure to update his contact information did not
injure MarshCODE, and because he performed his main obligation, he
should be entitled to enforce the agreement against MarshCODE.
11. There are five factors total, but two are inapplicable to this case: “the extent to
which the injured party can be adequately compensated for . . . the benefit of which he will
be deprived” and “the likelihood that the party failing to perform . . . will cure his failure.”
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981). MarshCODE does not require any compensation for Mr. Murphy’s failure to update his contact information because it suffered no
injury, and it is not looking for Mr. Murphy to cure his failure at this time.
12. In In re Wolfe, the court described the rationale behind considering this factor:
“Perfect performance . . . is not required in an imperfect world. The doctrine of substantial
performance was devised as an ‘instrument of justice’. Its purpose is to avoid forfeiture on
account of a technical, inadvertent or unimportant failure to perform.” 378 B.R.Bankr. 96,
104 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007).
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Under the second factor, if the court were to find that Mr. Murphy
materially breached the agreement, he would forfeit his ability to recover
for the significant reputational harm arising from release of his personal
information. Mr. Murphy provided valuable personal and genetic information to MarshCODE and suffered severe reputational injury when
MarshCODE failed to keep his information confidential, as promised.
Therefore, his inadvertent failure to comply with a minor provision
should not preclude him from recovering for breach of contract.
Under the third factor, “[g]ood faith performance . . . of a contract
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency
with the justified expectations of the other party.” Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1981). Examples of bad faith performance include “evasion of the spirit of the bargain . . . [and] willful rendering of
imperfect performance.” Id. at § 205 cmt. d. Mr. Murphy acted in good
faith when he provided MarshCODE with his genetic and personal information, which he knew MarshCODE expected under the contract. Mr.
Murphy’s failure to update his contact information was not willful or intentionally evasive. He simply forgot to notify MarshCODE when he
moved. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of finding that Mr.
Murphy’s failure to perform was immaterial and that he substantially
performed under the contract.
A reasonable jury could conclude that MarshCODE, in receiving Mr.
Murphy’s personal, genetic, and phenotypic information for its research,
received benefits that far outweighed any injury it suffered when Mr.
Murphy did not provide updated contact information. Therefore, Mr.
Murphy has established a genuine dispute as to this material fact and
may recover for MarshCODE’s breach.
C. A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that MarshCODE Breached the
Original and Modified Agreements
Whether a party breached a contract is a question of fact for the
jury. Hanging Rock Iron Co. v. P.H. & F.M. Roots Co., 10 F.2d 154, 154
(7th Cir. 1925). A reasonable jury could conclude that MarshCODE
breached the agreement regardless of whether the original or modified
terms constituted the essential terms of the agreement. When
MarshCODE released Mr. Murphy’s personal information to Ms. Who, it
breached its promises in the original agreement to “provide maximum
protection from unauthorized access” and to ensure that Mr. Murphy’s
“personal information [would] never be associated with [his] genetic information.” (R. at 14.) The release of Mr. Murphy’s information also constituted a breach of the modified agreement, which obligated
MarshCODE to (1) “employ[ ] robust, multi-layered encryption and authentication methods,” (2) “conduct[ ] regular audits . . . to protect

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\28-1\SFT104.txt

148

unknown

Seq: 30

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

6-APR-11

11:55

[Vol. XXVIII

against unauthorized access . . . ,” and (3) obtain Mr. Murphy’s consent
to participate in Family Tree. Therefore, Mr. Murphy has established a
genuine dispute as to the element of breach.
1.

A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that MarshCODE Breached the
Original Agreement

MarshCODE breached its obligation to keep Mr. Murphy’s information confidential. The original agreement stated that MarshCODE
would use “the same encryption as banks and other financial companies
so as to provide maximum protection from unauthorized access.” (R. at
14.) Despite promising to provide maximum confidentiality and protection, MarshCODE disclosed Mr. Murphy’s full personal profile to Ms.
Who when she used the program’s invite feature. Based on these facts, a
reasonable jury could conclude that MarshCODE breached its promise to
provide maximum protection. Additionally, MarshCODE’s use of Mr.
Murphy’s information for Family Tree without his consent also constitutes a breach of the original agreement. MarshCODE used Mr. Murphy’s information for commercial services, despite its promise to keep
that information private and the fact that the parties had only contemplated using the information for scientific research.
2.

Even if the Modified Agreement Superseded the Original, a
Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that MarshCODE Breached the
Modified Agreement

“When the parties to a . . . contract have not agreed with respect to a
term which is essential . . . , a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 204 (1981). In Wood v. Lucy, the parties agreed that the plaintiff had
the exclusive right to market and sell the defendant’s products. 118 N.E.
214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). Although the contract did not expressly state that
the plaintiff would use reasonable efforts to market and sell the products, the court held that without such efforts the contract lacked “business efficacy.” Id. at 214-15. Therefore, the promise to make reasonable
efforts was an implied term of the agreement. Id. at 215.
Here, under the modified agreement, a participant, upon receiving
notice of the modifications, can opt out of participating in Family Tree.
The modified agreement states that “participation in activities and services that involve personal information is voluntary.” (R. at 19) (emphasis added). This statement implies that MarshCODE had to obtain some
form of consent from Mr. Murphy. Like in Wood, without such an implied obligation, the term “voluntary” would lack efficacy. MarshCODE
structured the revised conditions so that it could assume that participants had given their implied consent to participate in the services if
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they did not opt out after receiving notice of the modified agreement.
However, as applied to Mr. Murphy, MarshCODE was not warranted in
assuming that he consented to MarshCODE’s use of his information for
Family Tree. The notices sent to Mr. Murphy returned undeliverable,
which alerted MarshCODE that Mr. Murphy was unaware of his participation in the service. Therefore, MarshCODE knew that Mr. Murphy’s
failure to opt out did not demonstrate implied consent. Nevertheless,
MarshCODE uploaded Mr. Murphy’s private information to the service,
breaching its promise that his participation would be voluntary.
MarshCODE also breached its assumed obligations under the modified agreement when it failed to protect Mr. Murphy’s personal information from access by unauthorized third parties. The agreement stated
that MarshCODE would use sophisticated encryption methods and regularly audit its systems to protect against unauthorized access.
MarshCODE claims that it designed Family Tree to prevent automatic
disclosure of personal information, and in the case of a match, participants could choose whether to respond or share information. Despite
these obligations, a full personal profile of Mr. Murphy automatically appeared on Ms. Who’s screen when she used the service’s invite feature.
Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that MarshCODE breached
the modified agreement when it failed to encrypt Mr. Murphy’s information or take reasonable steps to prevent automatic disclosure. As noted
above, a reasonable jury could also conclude that MarshCODE breached
the agreement by failing to regularly audit its systems, as promised. See
supra Part I.C.4.
D. A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that MarshCODE’s Breach
Caused Mr. Murphy To Suffer Harm
Two purposes of awarding damages for a breach of contract claim
are (1) to put the plaintiff “in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed,” and (2) to “grant relief to prevent unjust enrichment.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 (1981). Because MarshCODE released Mr. Murphy’s private information to Ms.
Who, leading her to inform the media that he was her father, Mr. Murphy’s church condemned him and called upon him to resign as a minister. Although MarshCODE publicly apologized and admitted it made a
mistake, Mr. Murphy lost his reputable position in the church and has
been discredited among his family and community. A reasonable jury
could conclude that the harm suffered by Mr. Murphy directly resulted
from MarshCODE’s breach. In order to put Mr. Murphy in as good a
position as he would have been in had MarshCODE not breached the
contract, the court should award him an amount that would compensate
him for the significant damage done to his reputation. Additionally,
MarshCODE was unjustly enriched in receiving Mr. Murphy’s valuable
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genetic and personal information without reciprocating by performing its
own contractual obligation to keep it confidential. The court should
therefore also grant Mr. Murphy an amount equal in value to the benefits he conferred upon MarshCODE.
Because Mr. Murphy has demonstrated genuine disputes as to each
element of the breach of contract claim, this Court should reverse the
grant of summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court REVERSE the decision of the Marshall Court of Appeals for the First District and remand to a jury.
Respectfully Submitted,

Attorneys for Appellant

